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Legalization of abortion in the 1970s represents a major cultural change: it gives women 
a higher degree of freedom to directly control their fertility, allowing them to ultimately 
decide upon children without man’s consent and to decrease uncertainty in their 
expected labor market returns. 
This public policy and its implications on female behavior have been so far analyzed 
through its direct consequences on fertility and fertility technology, primarily on women 
actually experiencing an abortion.  
However, it seems relevant to evaluate its indirect effects on female bargaining power 
within the household, for all women that face abortion as an actual opportunity, without 
necessarily experiencing one. Although indirect, this impact may be widespread since in 
principle it concerns all couples where the woman is in her fertile age.  
I focus on the indirect effect of abortion legalization in the United States on women’s 
position in the household. My findings suggest that the legalization positively affected 
female bargaining power.  
In a dynamic model of possible commitment to marital contract, I analyze households 
that were already formed before the legalization and I test for the renegotiation of the 
household’s initial contract in the presence of the shock to bargaining power balance 
represented by abortion legalization. Results seem to reject the full commitment 
assumption.  
Specifically, I analyze the legalization of abortion as a distribution factor in a collective 
model of household behaviour through its effects on female labor supply and find that 
(controlling for the number of children) the legalization significantly decreased labor 
supply of married women in their fertile age and significantly increased their husbands’, 
while no such effect is found for older married women nor for single and divorced 
women or men. 
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Abortion legalization has always been one of the most debated policy issues in the United States and in many Western 
countries, recently also at the United Nations level
2. In the United States in particular, there have been many federal and 
state laws, amendments and regulations that have alternatively modified the conditions under which abortion is legal 
and the restrictions to women’s autonomous decision.  
Legalization of abortion undoubtedly affects women’s freedom to ultimately control their fertility. It represents a new 
right to female autonomy in the fertility decision, an issue that in principle concerns both spouses involved in a 
relationship.  
It is interesting to investigate and evaluate the impact of abortion legalization on female empowerment, specifically 
within the household, through its indirect effects on spouses’ bargaining power. Such a right to women’s autonomy in 
planning fertility may increase the female intra-household power and influence the household allocation of resources 
through two main channels. First, this right represents a new opportunity for the woman to decide upon children with or 
without man’s consent, possibly affecting his fertility choices. It may be the case that spouses disagree on the number 
and timing of children, so that this new availability gives women more freedom with respect to men, possibly binding 
men’s fertility decisions
3. Second, this opportunity to avoid unwanted pregnancies decreases women’s uncertainty about 
their future career which, ex ante, is likely to make their expected life-time earnings larger than before the legalization. 
Abortion statistics (Allan Guttmacher Institute, US, 1970s) show that the practice of abortion is indeed seen as an 
opportunity by women involved in a stable relationship: around 27 % of women undergoing an abortion are legally 
married
4. Hence, abortion may represent a credible threat and bound for men. Also, the vast majority of women 
undergoing an abortion are reported to do so because they do not want the child or they want to delay fertility, 
suggesting that this opportunity is used when an actual voluntary choice is involved, not merely for extreme 
contingencies such as rape, incest, fetal or woman’s health problems (precisely, about 90 % for “unwantedness” reasons 
                                                 
2 Refer, for instance, to the declarations at the United Nations World Conference on Women at Beijing (1995) and 
Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (1994).  
3 In the literature on reproduction and fertility goals, potential disagreement between spouses is accounted for. For 
example, Coombs et al. (1979) state that “reproductive goals of one marital partner cannot with confidence be assumed 
to represent the views of the other”. Thomson et al. (1990) show that “disagreeing couples experienced fertility rates 
midway between couples who wanted the same smaller or larger number of children”. In particular, Williams (1994) 
says that a substantial proportion of births that are unwanted by mothers are wanted by fathers. 
  1
4 Of all women undergoing an abortion in the 1970s, 61 % are between the ages of 25 and 40, age group on which I 
focus for my empirical analysis. See the data description section for details. versus 10 % for those contingencies)
5. Moreover, sociological and gender studies show that abortion legalization is 
regarded specifically as a right which allowed women to decrease male domination within families
6. 
These statistical and literature evidence seems to suggest that the impact of abortion legalization on female bargaining 
power in the household may be economically sizable and interesting to model and estimate. 
Actually, legalization of abortion leads to many changes, as it is acknowledged in the literature. We can distinguish 
among three main effects of this phenomenon. 
1.  Fertility effect: direct impact. The legalization of abortion straightforwardly allows women to get an abortion: 
through their decision to abort, the legalization affects demographic variables, with a substantial decline in 
fertility. The literature (Levitt Donohue (2001), Levine et al. (1996)) shows that this direct impact on fertility 
subsequently led to changes in teenagers’ behavior on fertility, “out of wedlock” births and in crime. 
2.  Technology effect: indirect impact. The availability of abortion indirectly affects the fertility technology 
because it represents a sure mean of ultimately avoiding a pregnancy, as, for instance, the contraceptive pill is. 
Decisions on fertility, marriage and human capital investments may thus be affected, as it is precisely shown in 
Goldin-Katz (2001), Angrist-Evans (1996). These papers show that there is an indirect effect on long run 
increases in labor market participation and education of women who conceivably were on the contraceptive pill 
or took advantage of abortion legalization, not necessarily distinguishing across marital status.    
3.  Bargaining power effect: I propose a new analysis dimension, the indirect impact within families on 
household’s decision process. The legalization of abortion represents an opportunity for women to decide upon 
their fertility. This may increase female bargaining power within the household and thus influence the 
observed households’ optimal allocations, such as labor supply, participation and any specific consumptions 
variables that are susceptible to be influenced by bargaining power changes.      
Most of the literature on abortion or reproductive technology concentrates in either one or both of the first two impacts. 
However, the bargaining power effect may be relevant and widespread since it potentially affects all couples possibly 
dealing with fertility decisions
7: typically all couples where the woman is in her fertile age. In fact, all women for whom 
abortion becomes an available opportunity to self-determine fertility, including those that eventually never experience 
                                                 
5 These statistics on the reasons why abortion was undertaken are from 1987: they were not available before. However, 
in these past fifteen years unwantedness seems to represent the main motivation, so that these percentages are likely to 
reflect the 1970s as well. 
6 Historically, those studies were developed even before the literature regarding abortion as a source of female 
empowerment in society. Now this issue is taken further by considering abortion as one of women’s reproductive and 
sexual rights.  
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7 My analysis does not apply to lesbian or homosexual couples nor on the heterosexual couples where one spouse is 
totally dominant in the relationship. I refer to heterosexual couples where there is room for potential renegotiation of 
bargaining power balance between a man and a woman. an abortion, may increase their intra-household bargaining power towards their spouses as a consequence of its 
legalization. Not only their power should increase, but correspondingly their male spouses’ power should decrease. 
Also, this impact should show up immediately in the cohorts of women exposed to the legalization, since the 
legalization per se, as a new right to female autonomy, changes the bargaining power balance. Therefore, even though 
this intra-household effect is more indirect than the first order fertility decline effect, it may potentially affects a broader 
segment of the population. Then, the overall consequences of abortion legalization may be of much greater proportion 
than previously acknowledged. In addition to this, if we specifically consider an intertemporal framework, the 
bargaining power effect allows to investigate two further related issues: 1) to what extent spouses renegotiate their 
marital
8 contract when there is such an unanticipated shock to their bargaining power balance; 2) how different marital 
contracts of couples who got married before the legalization are from those of couples who got married after the 
legalization. In this present paper I do not address the second issue, mainly because of small sample size
9.   
In order to test and measure the bargaining power effect of abortion legalization, I will focus on labor supply decisions, 
as in the literature on bargaining power (Chiappori (1992), Chiappori et al. (2002)). The intuition for how an increase in 
female intra-household bargaining power due to abortion legalization can affect spouses’ labor supply is the following: 
ceteris paribus, an increase in women’s bargaining power gives women a higher share of household resources and this 
translates into a positive income effect for them; if the income effect goes in the regular direction (if leisure is a normal 
good), women’s labor supply decreases as a consequence of legalization of abortion.  
It is crucial to emphasize that this labor supply prediction of the bargaining power effect goes in the opposite direction 
with respect to the fertility and the technology effects found in most of the literature. Indeed, if women get access to 
better fertility technology and fertility itself declines, becoming less of a constraint, female labor supply increases, as it 
is well documented in the literature on abortion and birth control such as the contraceptive pill. Moreover, 
transformations in fertility and its technology can be dealt with both a unitary and a non-unitary setting of household 
behavior, whereas the impact on intra-household bargaining power can be analyzed only in a non-unitary framework. In 
fact, while the first two effects can influence women regardless of the marital status, the latter impact on bargaining 
power may affect only those involved in a relationship with a male spouse, i.e. legally married or cohabiting women. 
This male spouse is also predicted to be affected by the legalization. 
                                                 
8 Throughout all my analysis, I use the word married as synonym for both legally married and cohabitants. By the same 
token, all the related words such as husband, wife, marriage, marital should be interpreted as referring also to 
cohabitants. 
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9 In my current data set, only less than ¼ of couples got married after the legalization. However, I am planning to switch 
to CPS data to try to analyze this further question. The collective model of household behavior provides a natural theoretical framework to perform the analysis of this 
bargaining effect. Each spouse is assumed to have his own utility to maximize and spouses are assumed to take pareto-
efficient decisions. The legalization of abortion may modify the household’s environment and spousal opportunities, 
affecting the intra-household decision process and optimal allocations only through its impact on spousal bargaining 
within the household. In a dynamic setting, I focus on couples who got married before the legalization of abortion in 
order to avoid marriage market selection bias issues, and essentially to test for the renegotiation of their marital 
contracts due to the legalization.  
  
I consider both the national legalization of abortion in 1973 and the early state legalizations by California, New York 
state, Washington state, Alaska and Hawaii in 1970 as sources of variation in the availability of abortion
10. In fact these 
laws represented a very “open” legalization: women were allowed to decide autonomously (within a specified period 
from conception) and psychological distress and unwantedness were contemplated as motivations to seek an abortion
11. 
I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1970 to 1979, with household data across the United States, to 
assess the impact of abortion on female bargaining power.  
I estimate the impact of abortion legalization on married couples, singles and divorced. I find that the legalization 
significantly decreased labor supply of married women in their fertile age and significantly increased their husbands’, 
whereas for married women beyond the fertile period, for singles, divorced women and men there is no such effect. My 
results suggest that couples indeed renegotiate their marital contract in response to abortion legalization, when it 
represents an actual opportunity (fertile women). Furthermore, this renegotiation leads to an increase in these women’s 
intra-household bargaining power relative to their spouse.  
 
Section II presents the theoretical framework to analyze the impact of abortion legalization on female bargaining power 
in the household and the possible marital contract renegotiation, namely an intertemporal collective model of labor 
supply. The following Section III provides the labor supply specifications. Section IV contains a description of the data 
and Section V presents the empirical results. The last sections Section VI and VII discuss sensitivity analysis and 
alternative explanations and Section VIII concludes the paper.  
 
                                                 
10 I do not consider twelve other states that inacted abortion laws between 1967 and 1970 because they legalized 
abortion only under special restrictive circumstances (life danger, rape). These states laws are also generally discarded 
in the abortion literature.  
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11 See the appendix for a detailed timing and description of these laws.  II. Intertemporal collective model of labor supply with possible marital contract renegotiation 
 
In a collective household behavior setting, I consider dynamic models of labor supply, either with or without 
commitment towards marital contract.  
Each spouse in the household has a distinct utility function and the decision process is pareto-efficient. The household is 
composed of two decision makers, called husband and wife
12. They are assumed to be infinitely lived.  
Let h
i  and C
i  for i=1,2 denote respectively member i’s labor supply and consumption of a private composite good in 
period t; leisure is assumed to be a normal good. Let b denote the household net savings on a risk-free asset in period t. 
Let’s assume the standard specification of individuals with egoistic preferences, where welfare of member i does not 
depend on consumption or leisure of the other member (no externality, no public good): U  where U is 
strictly quasi-concave, increasing, continuously differentiable and z are preferences parameters. From now on, i = 1= 
wife; i = 2 = husband. 
t t
t






Spouses negotiate their marital contract and decide their optimal allocations of savings, consumption and leisure at the 
time of marriage in t = 0. Whether they decide upon the optimal allocations for the whole time horizon, and whether 
their observed behavior is possibly affected by abortion legalization, depends on the degree of commitment
13.  
 
1) Full commitment 
Under full commitment, spouses stick to their marital contract throughout the whole period, even though the variables 
influencing bargaining power between spouses may change over time due to the legalization of abortion. The behavior 
of savings, labor supply and consumption over time is not affected by changes in these variables happening after the 
marriage.  
In fact, the household intertemporal efficient allocation of resources can be written as the solution of the following 
program: 
                                                 
12 I focus on spouses where the wife is in her fertile age, since abortion legalization may increase female bargaining 
power only for couples where fertility decisions are still an issue at stake. Once again, husband and wife stand for both 
legally married and cohabitant spouses. 
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13 I may use the same theoretical commitment framework to think of fertility decisions in terms of number and timing of 
children. They would be decided ex ante at the time of marriage and possibly renegotiated in favor of women at the time 
of legalization of abortion. In the data, preferences on number and timing of children can be captured by preference 
parameters and by the variables number of children and presence of infants in the household. ) , 0 [
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where y is the household non-labor income, w is the wage rate, r is the interest rate at which they can lend or borrow 
money, U is the husband’s reservation utility at the time of marriage; discount factors  and   and the interest 
rate r are assumed to be constant over time without loss of generality and, together with preference parameters, are 
omitted from any optimal allocation for notational simplicity (in particular, I assume r = 0). In general, the value of the 
reservation utility is a function of all information available at the time of the decisions. This information set is 
composed of all possible variables affecting bargaing power; in particular, I focus on distribution factors s, which 
consist of all other variables that modify household’s environment and spousal opportunities without changing 
preferences nor the pareto-set; specifically, I analyze legalization of abortion as an additional opportunity to the wife to 
directly control her fertility, possibly increasing her bargaining power. In a full commitment setting, I denote the 






The optimal allocation functions C  and the reservation utility function are assumed to be stationary. 
Also, the reservation utility, as well as the optimal allocations, is assumed not to depend on past realizations of non-
labor income and wages for notational simplicity. 
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Theorem. Under full commitment, the above program is equivalent to the existence of the pareto-weight  , constant 
throughout the whole period, so that spouses solve the following optimization: 
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Proof. Lagrange theorem on the existence of Lagrange multipliers.       
With full commitment, only the distribution of bargaining power at t = 0 matters: therefore,  is affected by 
bargaining power variables only of time t = 0. Since spouses commit ex ante to the stream of optimal allocations, 
legalization of abortion does not have any impact on households who got married before the legalization. Even though it 
may represent a change in distribution factors, spouses keep the power balance they established in t = 0. Therefore, 
under full commitment, abortion legalization should not have any impact on household behavior. In fact, the full 
commitment assumption does not allow to identify the reason why there is no such impact: it may be the case that 
abortion legalization does not affect bargaining power at all (it is not a distribution factor) or that indeed it represents a 
distribution factor but couples already married before the legalization are in fact fully committed.   
0 µ
 
The full commitment assumption may be too restrictive: it may not be realistic to assume that spouses commit to 
allocations decided at the time of marriage for their entire life together. In terms of the model, spouses may change their 
bargaining power balance and renegotiate their marital contract. Thus, the pareto-weight may vary accordingly over 
time. We can consider two sub-models of the limited commitment, both allowing for renegotiation of the marital 
contract due to unanticipated changes in bargaining power variables: a model of commitment but with full renegotiation 
at the time of the unexpected shock; a model without commitment where spouses negotiate their optimal allocations at 
any date.  
 
2) Commitment with renegotiation due to unanticipated shocks to bargaining power 
Under commitment with renegotiation, spouses stick to their marital contract until there is an unanticipated shock to 
their bargaining power, namely the legalization of abortion, making them renegotiate their optimal allocations at the 
  7time of the shock. The behavior of savings, labor supply and consumption over time possibly changes after the marriage 
in response to abortion legalization.  
In fact, the household intertemporal efficient allocations of resources can be written as the solutions of the following 
program: 
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  8Theorem. Under commitment with renegotiation, the above programs are equivalent to the existence of the pareto-
weights  and  , so that spouses solve the following optimizations: 
0 µ
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where  is the pareto-weight associated to the wife at the time of marriage and  is the pareto-weight associated 




Proof. Lagrange theorem on the existence of Lagrange multipliers.       
Before the legalization of abortion, only the distribution of bargaining power at t = 0 matters: therefore,  is affected 
by bargaining power variables only of time t = 0  
0 µ
  9When abortion is legalized, there is an unanticipated shock to the bargaining power; spouses renegotiate their marital 
contract through  . Then, the household sticks to the optimal allocations decided at t= legal for the whole time 
horizon from t = legal on. After the legalization of abortion, only the distribution of bargaining power at t = legal 
matters: therefore   and consequently the optimal allocations are affected by bargaining power variables only of 
time t = legal. In particular, if abortion legalization actually increases female bargaining power in the household, it must 
be true that: 
legal µ
legal µ
0 µ µ >
legal  
Therefore, abortion legalization should have an impact on households’ observed behavior since wife’s pareto-weight 
increases. 
 
3) No commitment 
Under no commitment, every period spouses decide their current optimal allocations, depending only on the current 
bargaining power. The behavior of labor supply and consumption over time may possibly change at any time after the 
marriage, not only in response to legalization per se but also to changes in accessibility of abortion.  
In fact, the household intertemporal efficient allocations of resources can be written as the solutions of the following 
programs: 
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  10Theorem. Under no commitment, the above programs are equivalent to the existence of the pareto-weights  , so that 
spouses solve the following optimizations: 
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where  is the pareto-weight associated to the wife at  time t. 
t µ
 
Proof. Lagrange theorem on the existence of Lagrange multipliers.       
In every period t, only the current distribution of bargaining power in t matters; therefore,   is affected only by 
current bargaining power variables. With no commitment, spouses are already updating their bargaining power balance 
and deciding their current optimal allocations period by period, independently of the realization of an unexpected shock 
to their bargaining power.    
t µ
When abortion is legalized they take into account of the new power balance favorable to wives. Before the legalization, 
       ∀ , and at the time of the legalization,  for t = legal.  
0 µ µ =
t legal t <
legal t µ µ =
Moreover, the no-commitment assumption allows for further adjustments in the power balance in response to changes in 
the degree of legalization, e.g. in terms of accessibility of abortion. If actual accessibility of abortion changes over time 
affecting wife’s opportunity to directly control her fertility, spouses may change behavior accordingly. In particular, if 
abortion legalization actually increases female bargaining power in the household, it must be true that: 
k legal legal − > µ µ ] , 1 [ legal k ∈ ∀    
Moreover, if actual accessibility of abortion changes over time and, by affecting wife’s opportunity to directly control 
her fertility, further modifies her bargaining power, it also holds that:  
j legal k legal + +
<
>
µ µ     ∀   0 ≥ ∀k 0 > j
  11
Therefore, abortion legalization should affect household’s observed behavior since wife’s pareto-weight increases.  Testable predictions on labor supply 
I use the concept of sharing rule, an equivalent alternative way of representing the intra-household power balance; it 
determines how non-labor income is divided between the two spouses in every period t. By efficiency, it is equivalent to 
the pareto-weight formulation.  
After illustrating this equivalence, I derive the theoretical predictions that each model yields on how the change in 
bargaining power due to abortion legalization affects the sharing rule; subsequently, I use the impact of the sharing rule 
on labor supply to link the legalization to a labor supply effect. In this way, the testable predictions on labor supply will 
consist of ultimately testing whether the sharing rule changes due to abortion legalization.   





); a change in 
her share is an income effect and implies a change in the opposite direction of her labor supply. The reverse is true for 
the husband. 
 
1) Full commitment 
Theorem. Pareto-efficiency is equivalent to the existence of a time invariant sharing rule 
 such that the wife gets the share   of the household non-labor 
income, the husband gets the remaining (  –    ) and they solve the following programs: 
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Proof. First and Second Welfare theorems. 
 
  12Since  depends only on the distribution of bargaining power at t = 0,  is affected by bargaining power variables 
only of the time of marriage t = 0. The sharing rule   is chosen by the two spouses ex ante at the time 
of the marriage (t = 0): it only depends on information available at the time of the contract and it applies to every period 
t for the whole time horizon. Equivalently to  , we can state that the household sticks to the sharing rule   and to 
the optimal allocations she committed to in t = 0, even though the legalization of abortion may represent a distribution 
factor. Consequently, we can state that, everything else being equal: 
0 µ
0 ρ
) , 0 [
0 +∞ ∈ ∀t ρ
0 µ
0 ρ
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0 ρ ρ = ) , 0 [ +∞ ∈ ∀t
1 1
j legal k legal h h − + = 0 ≥ ∀k   0 > ∀j  
•   ⇒        ⇒        
0 µ µ =
0 ρ ρ = ) , 0 [ +∞ ∈ ∀t
2 2
j legal k legal h h − + = 0 ≥ ∀k  ∀   0 > j
Ceteris paribus, husband’s and wife’s respective labor supply should not change over time because of the legalization, 
since there is no increase (decrease) in wife’s (husband’s) share of non-labor income. 
 
2) Commitment with renegotiation due to unanticipated shocks to bargaining power 
Theorem. Pareto-efficiency is equivalent to the existence of the time invariant sharing rules 
 and  , such that the wife gets the share 
 if t < legal, or   if t   legal, of the household non-labor income, 
the husband gets the remaining (  –   ) if t < legal, or (  –  ) if 
t ≥ legal, and they solve the following programs: 
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Proof. First and Second Welfare theorems. 
Before the legalization of abortion, only the distribution of bargaining power at t = 0 matters: therefore,   and 
consequently   are affected by bargaining power variables only of time t = 0. 
0 µ
0 ρ
When abortion is legalized, the sharing rule  is chosen by the 
two spouses at the time of the legalization and it only depends on information available at the time t = legal; it applies to 
the whole time horizon from t = legal on. 
) , [ ) , , , , ( 1
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legal legal µ ρ ρ
Equivalently to  , we can state that the household sticks to the sharing rule   and to the optimal allocations she 
committed to in t = 0, until the unexpected shock of abortion legalization makes her renegotiate the bargaining power 
and optimal allocations in t = legal, using the sharing rule  . The household sticks to the sharing rule   and to 
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  14Ceteris paribus, the increase in the wife’s share of non-labor income represents a positive income effect, making her 
labor supply decrease after the legalization. The prediction for husbands has the opposite sign, since their share of non-
labor income consequently decreases: bargaining power is indeed a relative concept. 
 
3) No commitment 
Theorem. Pareto-efficiency is equivalent to the existence of the sharing rules , 
, such that the wife gets the share   of the household non-labor income, the 
husband gets the remaining (  –   ), and they solve the following programs:  
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Proof. First and Second Welfare theorems. 
The sharing rule   is chosen in each period t and it reflects the current bargaining power balance  .  
t ρ
t µ
In every period t, only the current distribution of bargaining power in t matters: consequently,  , as  is,  is affected 
by bargaining power variables only of time t. Under no commitment, the household renegotiates the bargaining power 
balance and optimal allocations in each t, using the sharing rule  . Ceteris paribus, spouses use   if t < legal 
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If actual accessibility of abortion changes over time and correspondingly affects her bargaining power, we can also state 
that: 
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Ceteris paribus, the increase in the wife’s share of non-labor income represents a positive income effect, making her 
labor supply decrease after the legalization. The prediction for husbands has the opposite sign, since their share of non-
labor income consequently decreases: bargaining power is indeed a relative concept. Moreover, the wife’s (husband’s) 
labor supply may further decrease (increase) after the legalization if the accessibility of abortion, measured as territorial 
availability of abortion clinics and/or price for an abortion surgery, increases (decreases) over time.  
 
Before turning to the data analysis, I present a summary of the prediction that each model yields on spouses’ labor 
supply evolution over time in response to the abortion legalization. These predictions will be tested in the data. The 
negative effect of abortion legalization on fertile wives’ labor supply and the corresponding positive effect on their 
husbands’ labor supply seem unique to the bargaining power effect; also, they specifically concern women in their 
fertile age who have a spouse. In particular, the impact on married fertile female labor supply is the opposite of those 










  16summary of testable prediction of the models
Changes due to the legalization of abortion on fertile wives' and their husbands' labor supply
Before and after the legalization
Share of non-labor income change in her share wife's ∆Ls husband's ∆Ls
before after before / after legal before / after legal before / after legal
 
Full Commitment  
Commitment with  . 
renegotiation
at t = legal
No Commitment  
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  17III. Labor supply specifications 
 
To test these predictions, I use the following labor supply equations: 
effects   fixed   spatial   and   temporal log log log log
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I consider preference parameters such as age and education of each spouse, race, household composition, number of children and 
presence of infants, which represent a relatively standard specification in the labor supply literature. I assume that the individual 
discount factors and household’s net savings are captured by those variables for both spouses and that the constant interest rate is also 
captured by the fixed effects. 
Moreover, since I will focus on a data set of households both in a time series and cross-sectional dimension, the variation in 
legalization of abortion and its accessibility will not only be across time but across states as well. 
In particular, to test for the bargaining effect of abortion legalization I will use the following specifications: 
1
t h  = a + b dy_legal + Xβ  +   
1 ε
2
t h = f+ g dy_legal + Xγ  +   
2 ε
The other regressors X include: logarithm of each spouse’s wage, cross term of these logarithms, age and age squared, years of school 
of each spouse, household non-labor income, number of children in the household, dummy variable for the presence of infants, 
number of family members, dummy for blacks, logarithm of state total income as a measure of state local economy and 
unemployment, dummy variables for divorce laws such as unilateral and community property provisions, year fixed effects and region 
fixed effects (North East, South, West, with dummy variables for California and New York states and their corresponding regions 
adjusted)
14. 
The dummy variable dy_legal is equal to one if abortion is legal
15. In terms of the models, it captures the possible sharing rule 
switching from   to  , with  
0 ρ
legal ρ ρ =  
legal ρ legal t ≥ ∀ , i.e. whether abortion legalization increases female bargaining power in 
the household and whether households renegotiate their marital contract in response to the legalization
16. It is a test of the full 
commitment assumption.  
                                                 
14 These preference parameters and controls are similar to those used in the labor supply literature, in particular in Chiappori et al. 
(2002) where the specific issue of bargaining power effects on labor supply is analyzed. 
15 In particular, it takes value of one for the five states that legalized abortion in 1970 and subsequently for all the US from the national 
legalization of January 1973 on (Supreme Court ruling of Roe vs. Wade). 
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16 In fact, the Supreme Court decision in 1973 legalized abortion unexpectedly, so that dy_legal represents an unanticipated shock. As 
to state legalizations in 1970, one for sure was expected (WA); however 1970 is the earliest year in my sample so that I do not exploit 
the time variation of these legalizations, but just the cross-sectional difference.  In this framework, testing these predictions consists of testing if dy_legal has a negative significant impact on fertile wives’ labor 
supply and if it has a positive significant impact on their husbands’ labor supply. 
 
Alternatively, to test the bargaining effect not only of abortion legalization per se, but of possible changes in abortion accessibility, I 
will use the following specifications: 
1
t h  = a + c dy_low + d dy_high + Xβ  +   
1 ε
2
t h = f+ m dy_low + n dy_high + Xγ  +   
2 ε
The dummy variable dy_low (dy_high) is equal to one if abortion is legal and there is a low (high) accessibility according to state 
abortion rates
17 yearly ranking, a good proxy for actual availability of abortion clinics and accessibility in terms of prices and services. 
I use a ranking threshold to classify states according to their abortion rates, year by year
18. States whose abortion rate in a given year is 
ranked above that threshold have dy_high equal to one (and dy_low is equal to zero); those which have it below have dy_low equal to 
one  (and dy_high is equal to zero). The classification is updated year by year, so that those dummy variables capture the actual 
variation in accessibility
19.  
By construction, the sum of these two dummies is equal to dy_legal.  
Those dummy variables capture both the legalization and the possible variation in the degree of accessibility
20. In terms of the models, 
they capture the possible sharing rule switching from   to  , possibly with 
0 ρ
legal ρ
j legal k legal + +
<
>
ρ ρ 0 ≥ ∀k  ∀ , i.e. whether 
abortion legalization and its accessibility increase female bargaining power in the household and whether households renegotiate their 
marital contract in response to the legalization and changes in accessibility. It is a test of the full commitment assumption versus the 
renegotiation assumption; it is also a test of the non-commitment assumption with renegotiation according to the evolution in abortion 
accessibility. 
0 > j
In this framework, testing the prediction of the impact of the legalization per se consists of testing if dy_low and dy_high have a 
negative significant impact on fertile wives’ labor supply and a positive significant impact on their husbands’ labor supply. Then, 
                                                 
17 Number of abortions per thousand live birth. 
18 For each year, I rank all the fifty-one states according to their abortion rates for that year. Since the categories are updated year by 
year, a state can be classified differently across years, also if it exhibits the same abortion rate. Given the steady increase in abortions 
just after the legalization, evaluating how accessible abortion is in a given state really depends on the period of time and on the other 
states. 
19 I do not use the abortion rates per se as a proxy for accessibility, because there is no reason to expect bargaining power to vary 
continuously with the actual rates: bargaining power may increase if abortion legalization represents a relevant opportunity for 
women, as it would be the case in “high” availability states, but not just if abortion rates increase of a given amount of units. I 
nevertheless run the regressions with actual abortion rates as a regressor, instead of those dummy variables; its coefficients have the 
right sign, even though not significant. 
  19
20 I also tried to use a dummy for the presence of Medicaid funding for abortion across states and years. It turned out to be not 
significant across specifications, possibly because it may concern only women under Medicaid. testing the prediction on accessibility consists of testing if these dummies have a statistically different coefficient, with the coefficient 
on dy_high bigger in absolute value than the dy_low one (| d |> | c | and  n > m )
21. 
 
I additionally use singles and divorced women in their fertile age as control groups. For them, the household is composed of only one 
decision maker, so that the collective model collapses into the unitary one, without negotiations, reservations utility nor pareto-weight. 
Legalization of abortion can not affect any intra-household bargaining power by definition, since they are a single-member household. 
Accordingly, I will use the corresponding labor supply equation: 
    effects   fixed   spatial   and   temporal log 5 4 3 1 + + + + + = t t t t o t z f s f y f w f f h
where   should be zero, since single individual’s labor supply does not depend on bargaining power variables.   4 f
 
In particular, to test for the absence of bargaining effect of abortion legalization, I will use the following specifications: 
t h  = a + b dy_legal + Xβ  + ε  
or alternatively: 
t h  = a + c dy_low + d dy_high + Xβ  + ε  
where in  X there are the same types of regressors as before but only those concerning the single member.  
All the models’ testable predictions imply that these coefficients b, c and d should not be significantly different from zero. 
 
 
IV. Data description 
 
I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data; this data set starts in 1968 and collects annual observations, following the 
same families and their split-offs over time. Households are followed through time by keeping track of the “head” of the household, 
who is also the interviewed person. In households including a couple, the husband is automatically considered the head in almost all 
cases
22.  
                                                 
21 If the coefficients are not statistically different, the specification collapses to the previous one with dy_legal, since by construction 
the latter is equal to the sum of the dy_low and dy_high. 
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22 I eliminate the very few households (less than 2 % of couples) where the sex of the head is female while there being a male spouse 
in the family. I use waves 3 to 13, i.e. data from 1970 to 1979. I do not use 1968 and 1969 data because some variables of interest are not recorded 
in these first two years, and the coding of many variables is not comparable to those of subsequent years. Wave 13 is only used to 
assign income and labor variables to year 1979
23.  
My sample is composed of married, singles and divorced
24. The PSID code for marital status classifies couples that are cohabitants as 
married. This makes my sample more representative of US families that have an actual spousal interaction decision process; it should 
also avoid a selection bias towards couples that decide to get legally married. Moreover, there is no risk to include unstable and short-
term relationships in the sample, because PSID treats cohabitants as married only from the second interview wave in which they are 
found to be living together
25. To comply with the theoretical predictions on renegotiation of marital contracts, I only keep couples who 
got married before the legalization of abortion
26.  
Moreover, I also split the sample according to age of wife (or of female single or divorced), to divide fertile from non-fertile women. 
These two groups are kept totally separate, since the same household is not allowed to have observations in both groups. There being 
no fertility question in the PSID, I use an age threshold below which women are considered fertile: I consider forty years old, a 
standard age upper bound, at least in 1970s when medical fertility technology was not yet developed
27.   
I exclude observations for which either the husband or the wife are different from one year to the subsequent one
28. This means that if 
a new household forms, it will enter my sample only from the subsequent year on. The main concern here is that whenever there is a 
major change in family structure, it is not clear to which head and wife the questions on income and labor are referred to, and also 
which spouses are affected by the law changes analyzed in this paper. 
In addition to this, I keep only couples where the wife is actually present and exclude all households that have other income receivers 
besides the husband and wife. Since the focus is on the bargaining power balance within spouses, I cannot keep families where one 
spouse is in fact absent or households where other adults not only do live together with the couple, but represent an additional source 
of household income and potential decision power. Consequently, the household income variables are computed net of these other 
income receivers’ total labor and transfer income.  
                                                 
23 Later years are not included in the sample because laws, state regulations, amendments and Courts’ rulings on abortion issues 
become much more frequent, making the classification of whether abortion is legal more problematic.  
24 I do not include widowed and separated couples to keep a neat distinction between multiple decision makers and one decision maker 
households. 
25 In fact, PSID records a “self-reported” marital status variable from 1977 on, where this distinction is actually made. Comparing 
these two variables at the end of the 1970s, it looks like at most 1 % of the PSID sample is cohabiting, representing around 1.5 % of 
all couples. 
26 Before the national legalization and also before the state legalization for those households living in the five states that legalized 
abortion in 1970. I have used different measures of  “married before state legalization”, including or not households which moved to 
those states just after 1970, requiring or not that they stay in one of those states at least up to 1972, etc. Results are robust to these 
definitions. 
27 As to non fertile women, using forty years old as lower bound should retain at most 5 % of all pregnancies. At any rate, results are 
robust to changes in the age threshold and in particular to its increase as lower bound for non fertile. 
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28 To check if a household that is present in the survey for more than one year is actually composed of the same husband (wife), I 
check if the husband (wife) at time t is at most two years older than at time t-1: if this condition is not fulfilled, I do not include the 
corresponding household observation in my sample for year t. This is done through the dummies “dy_check_h” and “dy_check_w” for 
husband and wife respectively. My main sample consists of working individuals (in case of couples, both spouses have positive hours of work)
29. All individuals are 
aged 25 or more, to get more “stable” and homogeneous households, for which the assumption of efficiency in the intra-household 
decision process is more likely to be satisfied, and especially to discard full-time students, teenagers and very young married and 
divorced couples.  
The dependent variables, annual hours of work (of husband and wife), are defined as total annual hours of work on all jobs in a given 
year. The wage rate is computed in the data as the average hourly earnings, defined by total labor income divided by annual hours of 
work. Total family income is the total amount of resources available to a household in a given year
30. I construct the variable non-
labor income available to husband and wife as total family income minus the labor incomes of both spouses. All income, wage and 
labor hour variables refer to values of the calendar year prior to the interview and thus are “lagged”. All monetary variables across 
years are also deflated by the CPI index (for urban consumption, not seasonally adjusted, June figures) and are in 1970 $. 
Children variables consist of the total number of children aged 0-17 present in the household (there being no detailed information on 
children’s age brackets in the interview waves under consideration), and of a dummy variable “dy_age03child” denoting a household 
where the youngest child present is aged at most three years old.
31  
As to education, I use the number of grades completed by husband and wife. PSID started to record this variable in 1975, topcoding 
the years of schooling at 17. There are no missing values for this variable and since it is a variable that remains constant over time 
when you are no longer a student, I attributed the 1975 values back to the same households present in years 1970 to 1974
32. As to race, 
only race of the head of the household is available, so that we cannot detect how many interracial couples there are. I construct a 
dummy variable (dy_black) denoting a black household head. In the PSID sample in the 1970s individuals are almost all either black 
or white, so that one dummy should be enough to capture the racial effect on labor supply and household behavior in general.  
Outliers on total family income, wage, hours worked and number of children are excluded from the sample. Specifically, an 
observation is considered an outlier if it belongs to the top or bottom 2 % of the sample distribution (only top 2 % for children, 
otherwise we would eliminate all households without children; as to hours worked, only positive amounts are considered to compute 
the outliers). I also drop households where the husband, or the single decision maker, has three years of school or less. I do not remove 
                                                 
29 This may introduce a selection bias towards non working individuals. I take into account of this bias in my empirical analysis. 
30 All household net assets (rents, dividends, interest) are included in “taxable” income, which in turn is included in the definition of 
total household income. I cannot compute any savings or any income variable net of savings because in the 1970s PSID does not 
record any savings variable. 
31 Children variables, as well as non-labor income and wages, are treated as exogenous variables in my main specifications. There is 
some evidence that they are not likely to be endogenous: for instance, using PSID data in 1970s and married women’s labor supply as 
I do, Mroz (1987) can not reject the exogeneity of children, non-labor income and wages. At any rate, I take into account of the 
possible endogeneity issues in the sensitivity section. 
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32 This procedure drops few households, especially because my sample mainly consists of households who got married before the 
legalization, so that they were already present between 1970 and 1972. Also, I believe the exact years of schooling to be a better 
education measure than the bracket variable “education” available in PSID from 1968 for heads and, missing between 1969 and 1971, 
for wives.    the so-called “poverty sample”. It consists of families who were poor (below twice the poverty line) in 1966: however, by 1970 and 
even more so by the end of the 1970s, those households may have come out of poverty and I already exclude income outliers. 
Finally, to take into account of shocks to both the overall US economy and the state local labor market conditions, and of the fact that 
people may be different across different areas in the US, I use years fixed effects, regions
33 or alternatively state fixed effects, and the 
logarithm of state total income, as a proxy for state GDP. I cannot use the more specific state unemployment rate because up to the 
end of the 1970s it is not available; the county unemployment rate recorded in the PSID does not help either, since it is still a bracket 
variable and the coding changes during the sample period. I then discard the few observations from Alaska and Hawaii and abroad in 
the effort to maintain a homogeneous sample.  
I use PSID household weights to make the sample representative of the US population and economy. 
To account for different divorce laws in this decade, I follow Chiappori et al (2002), Gray (1998), Friedberg (1998) to construct three 
dummies, for unilateral divorce laws, community property laws and for the joint presence of these two provisions
34. 
My estimation sample consists of around 1897 households on average (6079 observations), of which 1491 (4869) come from multiple-
decision-maker households and 406 (1210) have only one decision maker. In particular, 968 (3254) come from fertile married 
women’s households, 297 (1026) from older married women’s households, 212 (672) from fertile single women and 194 (538) from 
fertile divorced women. For single and divorced, I focus on young women to have reasonable control groups to test the effects of 
abortion laws on household bargaining power.  
Men work on average more annual hours than women and earn a higher hourly wage. Also, husbands are on average 3 years older 
than wives. As to education, on average married men have more years of schooling than married women in young couples, but this is 
no longer true in the other groups. Black married couples are less than one half of the number of whites, while black young single and 
divorced women represent around 50 % of their group. On average non-labor income is higher for older married couples than for 
younger and for single women, but it is somewhat lower than for divorced women. Its large variance is due to the fact that younger 
households have on average negative assets while older households tend to have positive assets, its maximum values are in fact much 
higher for older couples.  
 
 
                                                 
33 I consider the PSID regions North East, North Central, South, West and Alaska-Hawaii, from which I exclude California and New 
York states, to add specific dummies for CA and NY, to single out these two highly populated and economically relevant states.  
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34 The majority of states inacted the unilateral divorce provision between 1970 and 1975. In fact, these two provisions may be 
distribution factors potentially influencing spousal bargaining within intact households. The dummy for unilateral divorce (“dy_unil”) 
is constructed in the following way: a state in a given year is defined to have a unilateral divorce law, if spousal consent is not required 
to divorce and if fault grounds are not allowed not even for property settlements and alimony. Since unilateral divorce laws per se are 
not favorable to women, unless they are paired with favorable laws concerning property division, I also use a dummy variable for the 
presence of community property laws. Married women’s bargaining power is likely to be stronger in community property jurisdictions 
when unilateral divorce is legal, or under common law and mutual-consent divorce, if household assets are disproportionately in the 
husband’s name. Refer to the Appendix for a scheme of states and years in which these laws are present. V. Results 
 
V.1 Main specifications 
I run my labor supply regression specifications
35 on fertile married women, their husbands, and on the other “control” groups such as 
single, divorced women in their fertile age and married women no longer fertile. 
The main specification with dy_legal and region dummies outlined in Section III yields clear results.  
For fertile married women the coefficient of dy_legal is negative significant; correspondingly, their husbands exhibit a positive 
significant coefficient, as theory predicts. For all the other groups not affected by the abortion bargaining power effect because wives 
are no longer fertile or because there is no spouse, dy_legal is totally not significant. Moreover, these coefficients of fertile married 
women, their husbands and married non-fertile women are also statistically different
36.  
To corroborate my results, I consider four other specifications of the same labor supply equations for the same groups of households: 
heckman two-step to take into account of a possible selection bias for working individuals, fixed and random effects models for 
households effects and state instead of region fixed effects in my main regressions. It is remarkable that all these specification confirm 
the negative significant effect of abortion legalization for married fertile women and a corresponding positive impact for their 
husbands, while the legalization appears not to be significant in explaining the labor supply pattern of single and divorced fertile 
women and of married non-fertile women
37.  
Looking at the magnitude of this impact of abortion legalization on bargaining power in terms of labor supply, the decrease in annual 
hours worked of married fertile women is of about 200 hours at 3 % significance, while for their husbands the corresponding increase 
is of about 80 hours at 1 % significance. These effects are sizable, corresponding to a 15 % reduction of the average hours worked by 
married women below forty years old; for their husbands, the percentage becomes a 3.5 % increase of their average hours worked. 
Conversely, the magnitude of the coefficients for singles, divorced fertile women and for non-fertile married women is negligible, 
sometimes even positive and definitely not significant. The magnitude of the impact of abortion legalization is large, especially if we 
think that in the 1970s women are steadily increasing their labor participation and labor supply, and that abortion legalization directly 
affects fertility in a way that should increase female labor supply. If we compare this abortion bargaining power effect to the divorce 
                                                 
35 I use robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance), clustered by state. Even though I do not impose the 
panel dimension structure in the covariance matrix, I account for the independence of households’ observations between states and 
allow for a possible independence across households within a state; also, I use years, regions or state fixed effects in all regressions. 
Clustering by state should be sensible in a framework where geographic, as well as legalization variations across time and space are 
relevant. However, clustering by household identity yields the same results. 
36 I can not pool singles or divorced women together with married fertile women in order to test for the statistical difference of their 
coefficients, because the former are single decision maker households and hence have a distinct labor supply equation.  
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37 However, only the heckman two-step exhibits a statistical difference in coefficients. In the PSID the cross-sectional dimension is too 
large compared to the time dimension, especially for only one decade of data; using fixed effects models may wipe out all the 
variation across households; the same may happen to the state fixed effect specification, with the presence of 48 dummies in each 
regression. It is also true that I cannot use household weights in the fixed and random effects models in my statistical package, as 
instead I do in all my other specifications; the lack of statistical difference in the fixed, random and state effects may be due to the 
imprecise estimates.       bargaining power effect on labor supply documented in Chiappori et al. (2002), results are similar. In their study of cross-sectional 
differences of divorce laws across states, the mutual provision decreased female labor supply by 117 hours and increased their 
husbands by 22 hours on average. My magnitudes, as well as the stronger response of women with respect to men, are comparable to 
theirs; nevertheless, the average hours worked in my 1970s sample of young women are lower than theirs in 1989, making my 15 % 
and 3.5 % around the double of their effect. These figures seem sensible of we think that my sample consists of women below forty 
years old and their husbands: not only younger couples may be more responsive, but on average they also work fewer hours than 
couples up to sixty years old. Furthermore, if other common divorce provisions such as community property division and/or enforced 
court payments are also in place, the changes in hours become more than 10 % for women and around 3 % for men, exactly 
comparable to mine
38. It seems reasonable that abortion legalization represented a major increase in female bargaining power since it 
has been a one-shot symbolic shock; moreover, the legalization of 1973 by the Supreme Court ruling was sudden. Those divorce laws 
state variations concern particular provisions, not the legalization of divorce per se. The control that women achieve on their fertility 
increases their decisional power on such a relevant issue for both spouses as children, and at the same time increases their monetary 
power because the uncertainty in their future earnings decreases (if not their expected value increases) due to their ultimate control on 
fertility.  
Similar evidence comes from the other labor supply specification with the availability indeces dy_low and dy_high. I use the threshold 
top 20 % (bottom 80 %) of state abortion rate ranking. These regressions as well show that only married fertile women and their 
husbands are affected by the legalization. Moreover, not only their coefficients for both dy_low80 and dy_high20 are negative 
significant, but the coefficient for dy_high20 is always larger (in absolute value) than and statistically different from dy_low80 in the 
main specifications. It seems that the bargaining power effect may be enhanced by a high accessibility of abortion services.  
All other variables in the regressions show parameter estimates at conventional levels, comparable to the female labor supply 
literature. In particular, the dummy for blacks is significant and sizably positive for young married women, whereas it is negative but 
mildly significant for singles and divorced young women. The dummy for infants is instead very significant and sizably negative for 
young married women, and it remains negative and rather significant also for the other groups of women. As to the divorce dummies, 
there are spurious results, also varying across specifications, which may be due to small sample size combined with the presence of 
many dummy variables
39. For instance, in the main specification, while for married fertile women the coefficients are all negative and 
                                                 
38 Chiappori et al. (2002) also use a cross-sectional divorce laws index of various provisions, which yields smaller effects. However, 
my focus is on the intertemporal effect of abortion laws on labor supply, so that I compare my results to their state divorce laws 
variables specification. 
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39 Two caveats apply to interpret these divorce laws pattern. First, among the category “married” there are also cohabitants, whose 
bargaining power balance should not be affected by divorce laws, at least not in the same way as legally married couples. Therefore, 
the presence of cohabitants can generate spurious results. Second, couples may envisage the possibility of a divorce when signing the 
marital contract, already ruling on division of property in case of divorce, so that divorce laws may not affect couples already married 
in the years preceding the state law change. Finally, estimating the effects of abortion legalization without the divorce dummies in my 
regressions, I obtain the same results, both in terms of significance and magnitude of the coefficients. not significant, for their husbands the cross term is very negative and significant and the other two dummies are positive significant 
and for older married women the cross term between unilateral and community property is positive significant.  
 
All this evidence goes in the direction predicted by the theory and suggests that the bargaining power effect of abortion legalization is 
relevant and sizable.  
At the same time, these results represent a rejection of the unitary model, in which no distribution factor influences household 
behavior.  
They also suggest a rejection of the full commitment model: marital contracts are imperfect and it seems like we can not model 
household behavior using a full commitment approach. The significant decrease of married fertile women’s labor supply, and their 
husbands’ corresponding increase due to legalization of abortion, show that couples actually respond to shocks such as abortion 
legalization and renegotiate their marital contract. They are also likely to update their decisions over time following the evolution of 
the actual accessibility of abortion.    
 
To further test the power of my results I analyze subgroups of married fertile households with characteristics that to some extent 
predict their degree of response to abortion legalization. It is interesting to explore the pattern of the bargaining power effect within 
these ex ante dimensions.  
 
V.2 Religion, birth control and expected children 
With the help of questions asked in PSID, I identify three dimensions through which I divide my sample of married fertile women: 1) 
religion, i.e. catholic versus religious denominations not totally opposing abortion; 2) use of birth control, i.e. households using birth 
control versus households not using any; 3) whether more children are expected, i.e. households expecting more children versus 
households not expecting any more. The predictions within groups are the following. Catholics should exhibit a much lower (if any) 
bargaining power effect due to abortion legalization than the whole group of married fertile women and in particular lower than other 
religions with a more “flexible” view on abortion. For the Catholic Church, abortion is a capital sin and all the focus is on the rights of 
the yet-to be-born child; whereas some protestant denominations, such as Methodists, Episcopalian, Presbyterian and atheist in 
general
40, somewhat express understanding for women’s choice of unwantedness
41 and the views on abortion never involve an 
inflexible definition as sin. As to birth control, if couples already use a contraceptive method, abortion legalization does not represent 
such a new opportunity to control fertility. Hence, the bargaining power effect should be much milder (if any) for this group than for 
                                                 
40 I could not consider Unitarians because PSID does not single them out as a distinct group. 
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41 For instance, the Catholic Church states that “abortion directly violates the divine commandment “you shall not kill”….it’s an attack 
against human life” (Evangelium Vitae, 1995), while Methodists state that “they respect the sacredness of the life and well-being of 
the mother, for whom devastating damage may result from an unacceptable pregnancy” (United Methodists Social Justice Stands). the whole sample or for the households not using contraception. Supposedly female bargaining power already changed with their 
decision of contraception, and fertility is less likely to be a conflicting issue for these households. Finally, couples not expecting 
children may not consider abortion legalization as a shock to their bargaining power balance because fertility choices are no longer at 
stake for them: it does not really represent an opportunity that can change their decisions and give women more freedom, since 
fertility is presumably no longer a source of conflict. Consequently, the bargaining power effect should be much milder (if any) for 
this group than for the whole sample or for the households still expecting more children. 
Some clarifications apply. In PSID, the question on religious preference is asked every year, while those about the use of birth control 
and expectations of more children have been asked only in 1972. This year is before the national legalization which is my main source 
of variation. The answer on expected children may be endogenous to abortion in states that legalized in 1970, before the question was 
asked: households living in those states may be more likely to answer that they do not expect children because they are aware of the 
abortion legalization and its implications for fertility. Yet, I believe this dimension is still indicative; in particular, if an endogenous 
bias exists it should go in the opposite direction of my prediction: it should make those answering “not expecting any more” more 
responsive to abortion legalization because the bargaining power effect should be already in place in those states. As to religion, two 
comments are needed. First, the attitude of the entirety of the believers towards abortion may not necessarily reflect the official 
positions of their churches on this topic. However, I believe my empirical results across religious groups are interesting since their 
views on abortion are clearly divergent. Second, all these questions in PSID are asked to the head of the household (husband), so that 
we know the religion of the head of the household. General statistics on mixed marriages and a later question on religion of the wife 
(not used for too small sample size) show that in around ¾ of marriages spouses are of the same religion, even more so in the 1970s
42.  
 
The evidence on these subsamples of married fertile women confirms these predicted attitudes. Across the main specification 
regressions run on catholics, the coefficient of dy_legal is totally not significant and very mildly negative, while for Methodists, 
Episcopalian, Presbyterian and atheist in general, dy_legal is negative and very significant and even of larger magnitude than for the 
whole sample. As to the birth control dimension, couples using birth control exhibit a non-significant negative coefficient on dy_legal; 
couples not reported to use birth control show instead a very negative and significant coefficient. The prediction of lower impact of 
abortion legalization on couples not expecting children is also confirmed: their coefficient of dy_legal is not significant across 
specifications, while for couples expecting more children dy_legal has a negative significant coefficient. 
 
These findings, together with the results on different marital status groups, represent comforting and ample evidence against the 
rejection of bargaining power effects of abortion legalization and of the collective model with renegotiation.  
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42 I do not present here other dimensions, for instance whether or not there is a large age or education gap between spouses, because 
there are mixed results, very few observations for some subgroups and issues of selection bias.  
 
VI. Sensitivity analysis 
 
I performed robustness checks on my empirical results across various regression specifications and dimensions, to get a confirmation 
of my theoretical predictions on the bargaining power effect and its implications on renegotiation. I illustrate the main ones in what 
follows, while an extensive discussion of alternative explanations will be performed in the next section.   
Looking at the income distribution dimension, I analyze the response to abortion legalization of rich and poor married households 
where the wife is in her fertile age
43. As for the top 10 % of per capita household income, it is interesting to notice that the coefficient 
of dy_legal is not at all significant and mildly negative across specifications, while for the remaining “non-rich” the coefficients are 
very significant and of a larger magnitude than usual. This goes along with the fact that women of wealthy families can definitely 
afford to get safe abortions even before the legalization, so that the event of the legalization does not really affect their opportunities 
for fertility decision. The bottom 10 % of the per capita household income exhibits negative coefficients of very large magnitude, but 
not significant unless in the regression with state fixed effects. Also, the non poor subgroup of my sample exhibit negative significant 
coefficients but lower in magnitude than for the whole group. In principle, poor households respond more to the bargaining power 
effect because the abortion legalization represents an opportunity really taken advantage of by this group as these findings suggest; 
however, the sample size on one hand and the fact that Medicaid funding for abortion was available only up to 1976 may create this 
low power result
44. The comparison across the income range seems to show that legalization of abortion increased female bargaining 
power more for households not at the top of the income distribution.  
When I split the sample according to race, both black and white married fertile households exhibit a strong negative response to 
abortion legalization. It is somewhat surprising that the significance of dy_legal for whites is much higher than for blacks: even 
though a higher number of abortions are performed on white than black women, the abortion rate has always been higher for blacks.  
In the data description section I mentioned the possible endogeneity of children. I address this issue as follows. First, in my main 
specifications I consider children and income variables as exogenous. My motivation is primarily that in the literature on female 
supply there is evidence for not rejecting this exogeneity. In particular, Mroz (1987) shows that the exogeneity of children and income 
variables is not rejected and he focuses on married women’s labor supply, using PSID data of the 1970s exactly as I do. Second, I run 
the reduced form regression of the labor supply equation without children variables and also without wages
45: I find the same pattern 
                                                 
43 I will explicitly refer to the main group of married fertile women; however, as to the other groups, results keep the same pattern as 
in my previous analysis.  
44 I do not use the poverty sample as a poverty cutoff. In fact, in my sample of married fertile women, the average family income and 
non-labor income are similar to the corresponding averages of households not belonging to the poverty sample. See also Section IV. 
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45 It may be too drastic to drop the wage variables as far as intra-household behavior is analyzed: each spouse’s wage is a potential 
source of bargaining power. of results across specifications. The coefficient of dy_legal is negative significant for married fertile women and positive significant 
for their husbands, the magnitudes being very similar to my main specification. Also, for all the other groups the coefficient is not at 
all significant. Last, I instrument the children variables, non-labor income and wages; following Chiappori et al. (2002), I use years of 
school squared, father’s education, dummy variable for being catholic, dummy variable for being Latino, lagged wages and non-labor 
income, and the other suitable regressors as instruments. In this case as well I find the same pattern of results. 
 
The empirical results appear robust as well to modifications in the restrictions of the regression specification. Further robustness 
checks involve changes in the age cutoff for fertility of women (42-38 years old), in the age lower bound (22-28 years old), in the 
education upper bound and lower bound for each spouse (16 years of schooling instead of 17, 3 or 4 as lower bound), in the stability 
of marriage (same marital status in both the previous and subsequent year), in the abortion rate thresholds (top 25 % or 33 %). It may 
make sense to increase the age lower bound for divorced, to keep a more homogeneous group: women that around 25 years old are 
already divorced may differ sistematically from the rest of the sample. If we decrease the age lower bound to 22, 20 years old, the 
same pattern of results is observed, but with lower abortion coefficients. The sample size increases considerably, especially for fertile 
married women and singles; however, the probability of these new observations corresponding to a student or exhibiting teenage 
behavior is too high in my opinion to be included in the benchmark estimations. 
All these evidence across dimensions and specifications seems to confirm that the negative impact of abortion legalization on female 
labor supply is unique to married fertile women and that this bargaining power effect along with its prediction of renegotiation is 
sizable and significant. 
  
As last step of my empirical analysis, let’s turn now to discuss in depth the issue of alternative explanations to the bargaining power 
effect of abortion legalization. It is challenging to investigate other phenomena possibly driving such a distinctive pattern of a decrease 
only of married fertile women’s labor supply and of a corresponding positive impact on their husbands’. 
 
 
VII. Abortion and female labor supply: alternative explanations        
 
The explanation that the bargaining power effect, as a prediction of the intertemporal collective model with renegotiation, provides for 
the peculiar impact of abortion legalization on married fertile women’s labor supply and their husbands’ is a priori not exclusive. 
However, the collective model per se and our data allow testing for possible alternative explanations. In general, singles, divorced
46 
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46 I also run my main specifications on single and divorced men getting the same result of no significant impact of abortion and 
different pattern from married fertile women’s labor supply.  and older married women’s labor supply movements provide a simple and powerful test for explanations alternative to my bargaining 
power effect and its theoretical predictions. Other explanations may imply the same pattern for singles, divorced or old married 
women’s labor supply, since they share the same gender, age level or marital status as the main group of married fertile women. 
Indeed, in all our data specification, the empirical evidence clearly shows that the variables capturing abortion legalization do not have 
any impact on singles, divorced and older married women.  
 
My analysis consists of four points: 1) labor market shocks; 2) fertility and marriage market effects; 3) modifications in the use of 
contraceptives; 4) welfare effects for women. 
  
1) Spatial variation of labor demand, gender-specific and/or age-specific, wider economic shocks, especially after the national 
abortion legalization in 1973 with the first oil shock, may explain the significant decrease in labor supply of young married women. I 
think we can discard this explanation of downturns in the labor market, mainly for two reasons. First, in all regressions I control for 
wages and economy changes through years and regions fixed effects and state total income; second, these supposed labor market 
downturns do not seem true for young singles and divorced, and for older married women; if we think that younger workers respond 
more to economic shocks or that sectors demanding young female labor experienced downturns, this should hold also for young 
singles and divorced, but this is not what I find. Also, we know that female labor supply increased much overtime (not decreased) 
especially for married women. If, instead, labor demand varies according to marital status, and my abortion dummies are correlated 
with these unobserved labor market characteristics, we should see the same pattern for all married women’s labor supply both below 
and above the fertile age. Finally, such a distinctive increase in men’s labor supply, only for those married to fertile women, is hard to 
reconcile with economic downturns
47. The issue of possible measurement error caused by mobility across states in which abortion is 
available should not seriously affect my estimates. The fact that women living in neighbor states can go to states where abortion has 
been legalized would cause downward bias in the coefficient of the abortion dummies, making the true bargaining power effect even 
larger than in my findings. Also, this problem may raise only for variation across state laws, while my main source of variation is the 
national legalization of 1973. 
2) The impact of abortion legalization on fertility and possibly on the marriage market as the primary sources of female labor supply 
movements should not represent an alternative explanation. First of all, I control for children variables (number of children aged 0-17; 
presence of infants), as well as for the age of wives, their wages, labor supply, marital status; second, the delay or decrease in fertility 
that appear to be the direct effect of the legalization should lead to an increase in female labor supply (as found in the literature) not to 
a decrease only for married young women and to an increase for their husbands. The decrease in labor supply may indicate that they 
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47 I am planning to analyze the impact of abortion legalization also on labor market participation decisions. spend more time with their children. However, children variables are also instrumented and results do not change
48. Moreover, as to 
married market changes, I focus on couples who got married before the legalization, so that there should not be any such issue by 
definition. 
3) In general, birth control and female contraceptive methods, whose usage might have spread out in the 1970s, may yield the same 
bargaining power effect on labor supply as abortion legalization, because they give women an opportunity to control fertility 
decisions. Condoms, for instance, can not be considered as a bargaining power variable favorable to women because they require 
male’s consent, thus not providing women with the freedom to directly control fertility and in any case their usage widely spread one 
decade later, in the 1980s. I focus on the availability and change in use of the major female contraceptives such as IUD, diaphragm 
and above all the contraceptive pill. Typically, they all give women exactly the same independence of choice as abortion legalization 
does, at a lower economic and emotional cost. Hence, we could not disentangle the bargaining power effect of abortion legalization 
from the one of female contraceptive availability if all changes happened in the same period of time. It turns out that the pill became 
available to married women in 1960, and its diffusion was very rapid
49; as to the other two mentioned contraceptives, they were 
already available in the 1960s, and the major changes in their usage happened in the 1960s. As in point 2), their other possible fertility 
effects should move labor supply in the opposite direction than my findings, so as not to represent an alternative explanation, and in 
any case they would be captured by my children variables. Furthermore, it seems like there is no relevant substitution effect from 
female contraceptives to abortion: specifically, US data on married women and contraceptive use show a mild increase (less than 1 % 
per year on average) in the percentage of married women using contraception in general and the pill, IUDs and diaphragm in 
particular, during the 1970s. 
4) An increase in welfare benefits to women may explain a possible increase in women’s bargaining power and a decrease in their 
labor supply, since per se they represent a positive income effect. However, if welfare benefits somewhat discourage work and if their 
increase concerned all young women, singles and divorced would be affected too; if they concerned all married women, they would 
affect also women above their fertile age, as instead it is not the case. Moreover, I control for income, wages and children in all my 
regressions, so that welfare mechanism and eligibility, if any, should be captured by these variables. Primarily, the most important 
argument against this alternative explanation is that welfare by definition concerns only low-income households, whereas my results 
hold also when low-income are removed from my sample, with the same strong significant decrease in married fertile women’s labor 
supply, the significant increase in their husbands’ and no effect at all for singles, divorced and older married women
50. Finally, the 
timing and pattern of the main welfare benefits such as AFDC, EITC and mandated benefits look different from abortion legalization. 
For instance, AFDC real benefit per capita decreases in 1970s and it is generally not available to two-parent families (Hoynes, Moffit). 
                                                 
48 I am planning to model fertility decisions in my commitment framework. 
49 “Its use was approved by FDA in 1960 and its diffusion was so rapid that by 1965, 41 % of young married women using some form 
of contraception were “on the pill”” (Goldin Katz (2000)).  
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50 Actually, from the previous discussion on sensitivity, we know that for non-poor households results are even stronger than for the 
whole sample. Mandated benefits were affected by the federal legalization in 1978 (Gruber). EITC begins in 1975 as a modest program and then 
expands in the 1980s (Eissa Liebman, Moffit).  
   
All this discussion suggests that my identification strategy is plausibly capturing the claimed effect of abortion legalization on 
bargaining power, without an overestimation bias due to this kind of omitted variables. However, it is possible that abortion 
legalization is part of deep social transformations occurring in the 1970s, that may have changed the relationship and bargaining 
power balance between spouses; in particular, I am referring to the feminist and sexual freedom and widespread increase in women’s 






In this paper I propose, model and estimate the bargaining power effect of abortion legalization, focusing on the consequences of this 
legalization on female power within the household. My findings suggest that this legalization positively affected female bargaining 
power in households where women are in their fertile age.   
In the framework of an intertemporal collective model of labor supply, with possible commitment to marital contract, I analyze 
households that were already formed before the legalization and I test for the renegotiation of the household’s initial contract in the 
presence of the shock to bargaining power balance represented by abortion legalization. Results seem to reject the full commitment 
assumption and, overall, the unitary approach to household behavior. 
I consider the early abortion state laws in 1970 and the federal legalization in 1973 along with data on state abortion rates in the 1970s. 
I use PSID data from 1970 to 1979. I control for various family and labor market characteristics, and also for possible selection bias 
for working women. I find that the legalization significantly decreased labor supply of married women in their fertile age and 
significantly increased their husbands’, while no such effect is found for older married women nor for single and divorced women or 
men. It seems that during the 1970s in the US there has been a relevant impact on households’ decision process and a change in family 
allocation of resources, along with a redistribution of bargaining power between spouses and a major impact on female labor supply 
for those women favored by this intra-household reallocation and for their husbands. I performed many robustness tests across various 
regression specifications and dimensions to establish two results. First, this frequently debated public policy had an indirect impact on 
female bargaining power within the household, beyond the fertility, education and marriage market effects found in the literature. 
                                                 
51 I control for years and region fixed effects and for variables like race, education and children in all my estimates; it is also unlikely 
that these social changes had exactly the same time and state pattern as abortion legalization and abortion rates did. Finally, there is no 
reason to believe that these transformations would not impact older married women for a whole decade, nor singles and divorced 
young women and that they would decrease female labor supply.  
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 Second, the pattern of abortion legalization in that decade is important to explain those family changes. Nevertheless, it is possible that 
abortion legalization belongs to deeper transformations in social norms occurring in the 1970s in the US. This big symbolic movement 
may have changed spouses’ perception and the way to address women’s concerns in the household. 
 
This paper is meant to be a contribution to the understanding of the effects of abortion legalization, specifically by introducing the new 
dimension of bargaining power effect. The overall impact of legalization of abortion on various aspects of society may be wider than 
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“The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this 
choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in 
early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon 
the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. 
Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for 
all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of 














•  1973               ROE vs WADE ruling by the SUPREME COURT 
constitutional right of privacy to choose abortion within                    
specified periods;  public funding    
 
 
                                      EARLY STATE LEGALIZATION    
 
•  1970        CA  NY  WA  AK  HI:   
                          broadly available within specified periods; public funding        
 
 
•  1967-1970      AR CO DE FL GA KS MD NM NC OR SC VA:  
                                             only under special circumstances; no public funding 
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SUMM
  38 
ARY STATISTICS
married ≤ 40 years old married>40 years old 
mean (std. dev.)          min           max mean (std. dev.)          min           max
HH characteristics
hours worked wife 1255.893 (686.4) 50 2484 1348.605 (665.57) 49 2480
hours worked husband 2228.919 (509.4) 175 3680 1968.24 (713.07) 172 3675
log of wage of wife .887 (.542) -0.82 2.06 .874 (.515) -0.82 2.06
log of wage of husband 1.396 (.431) -0.39 2.38 1.32 (.554) -0.36 2.37
log wage_wife X log wage husband 1.288 (.949) -1.39 4.81 1.234 (.943) -1.23 4.08
age of husband 33.79 (5.58) 25 57 57.59 (6.91) 35 82
age of wife 31.098 (4.207) 25 40 54.97 (5.57) 42 72
# of years of school of husband  12.71 (2.73) 4 17 11.44 (3.22) 4 17
# of years of school of wife  12.39 (2.69) 0 17 11.69 (2.52) 0 17
household non-labor income 623.347 (1580.7) -3000 12848 1704.88 (2507.98) -1882.09 21630
labor income wife 3617.358 (2740.6) 36.19 13753.73 3843.954 (2924.28) 65.8371 14382.21
labor income husband 9605.573 (3945.83) 295 26779.14 8368.168 (4637.39) 279.1367 23891.63
# of children 0-17 in the family 1.793 (1.172) 0 5 0.218 (.67) 0 5
dummy for presence of infants .272 (.445) 0 1 .009 (.092) 0 1
# of family members 3.81 (1.18) 2 9 2.28 (.79) 2 9
dummy for black 0.088 (.28) 0 1 .08 (.27) 0 1
bargaining power variables
abortion
dummy for legal abortion .77 (.42) 0 1 .73 (.45) 0 1
dummy for top 20 abortion rate states .19 (.39) 0 1 .24 (.43) 0 1
dummy for bottom 80 abortion rate states.58 (.49) 0 1 .48 (.50) 0 1
divorce
dummy for unilateral divorce .19 (.39) 0 1 .19 (.39) 0 1
dummy for community property law .13 (.33) 0 1 .16 (.37) 0 1
unilateral X community property law .08 (.27) 0 1 .10 (.30) 0 1
# observations (# HH) 3254 (968) 1026 (297)
All monetary variables are in 1970 $  SUMMARY STATISTICS (continued)
single women ≤ 40 years old  divorced women≤ 40 years old
mean (std. dev.)          min           max mean (std. dev.)          min           max
HH characteristics
hours worked  1805.621 (538.2) 180 3612 1794.51 (568.78) 192 3643
log of wage  1.212 (.456) -0.38 2.26 1.04 (.51) -0.32 2.36
age 28.8 (4) 25 40 31.5 (4.31) 25 40
# of years of school   14.45 (2.22) 7 17 12.62 (1.86) 6 17
household non-labor income 466.5717 (1076) -595.09 12616 1106.32 (1321.8) 0 8152.8
labor income  6527.175 (2762.735) 229.36 16099.58 5701.98 (3040.68) 238.04 16099.58
# of children 0-17 in the family .19 (.66) 0 5 1.37 (1.07) 0 5
dummy for presence of infants .037 (.19) 0 1 .088 (.28) 0 1
# of family members 1.2 (.68) 1 7 2.39 (1.09) 1 7
dummy for black 0.15 (.36) 0 1 .16 (.36) 0 1
bargaining power variables
abortion
dummy for legal abortion .88 (.32) 0 1 .89 (.31) 0 1
dummy for top 20 abortion rate states .35 (.46) 0 1 .28 (.45) 0 1
dummy for bottom 80 abortion rate states.53 (.50) 0 1 .61 (.49) 0 1
divorce
dummy for unilateral divorce .29 (.45) 0 1 .21 (.41) 0 1
dummy for community property law .17 (.37) 0 1 .18 (.38) 0 1
unilateral X community property law .15 (.35) 0 1 .13 (.33) 0 1
# observations (# HH) 672 (212) 538 (194)
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Coefficients of dy_legal, the dummy variable for whether abortion is legal 
 
Labor supply regression specifications (dependent variable = annual hours worked) run on the below groups of households 
 
Married   Married  Single  Divorced  Men married 
fertile non-fertile fertile fertile to fertile women
women women women women
reg  coeff. -228.9209 26.255 44.58089 -157.0001 84.74177
robust SE 103.9693 113.5096 132.9282 180.494 29.98411
P value 0.033 0.818 0.74 0.391 0.007
Heckman coeff. -231.0824 82.30643 45.22168 -172.7425                *
2 step robust SE 110.8786 175.1893 112.8936 155.007
P value 0.037 0.638 0.689 0.265
FE model  coeff. -188.4712 -108.9619 13.23701 187.5217 74.69084
SE 76.78318 89.88847 134.1192 169.3872 62.1967
P value 0.014 0.226 0.921 0.269 0.23
RE model coeff. -188.0799 -126.6303 -82.22237 80.23523 72.5349
SE 68.24426 83.93027 124.1277 143.4389 54.75274
P value 0.006 0.131 0.508 0.576 0.185
reg with coeff. -159.997 -121.4914 -91.21757 -193.6216 84.73326
dy states robust SE 68.46778 181.3714 77.50126 187.325 36.59229
P value 0.024 0.507 0.248 0.309 0.025
# observations 3254 1026 672 538 3254
# obs. for heck. 2 step 5542 2418 851 628  
 
Reg is my main specification with region fixed effects 
Heckman 2 step is the heckman specification (mle) to take into account of the possible selection bias. 
FE model is the fixed effects specification, where the unit of observation is the household. 
RE model is the random effects specification. 
Reg with dy_states is the specification with state fixed effects instead of regions. 
All regressions use PSID household weights and are clustered by state (apart from the FE and RE specifications).* Men that are the actual husbands of the women in the first column: maximize 
a MLE function for these men’s hours taking into account that their wives’ wages may be missing because some wives may not be working (to be done soon) 
  40 Table 2 (continued) 
 
Coefficients of dy_legal, the dummy variable for whether abortion is legal 
 




Single men ≤ 40  Divorced men ≤ 40
reg  coeff. 175.7288 -27.2507
robust SE 248.3992 276.0511
P value 0.484 0.922
Heckman coeff. 160.4572 -26.3934
2 step robust SE 236.8591 268.6867
P value 0.498 0.922
FE model  coeff. -117.65 131.173
SE 178.8833 485.7234
P value 0.511 0.787
RE model coeff. 65.84294 5.379355
SE 151.9922 320.4882
P value 0.665 0.987
reg with coeff. 115.0406 -165.534
dy states robust SE 283.7595 258.6806
P value 0.688 0.526
# observations 575 411
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Labor supply regression specification with region fixed effects, run on married fertile women (dependent variable = annual hours worked)  
Parameter estimates
coefficient (std. dev.)    P value
log of wage of wife 361.8339 (106.1094) 0.001
log of wage of husband -39.0113 (71.61748) 0.589
log wage_wife X log wage husband -82.99519  (71.13886) 0.25
age of husband 17.14531 (51.09891) 0.739
age of wife 51.58722 (85.4188) 0.549
# of years of school of husband  -36.06613 (9.39346)       <.001
# of years of school of wife  -3.939507 (6.458533) 0.54517
household non-labor income -.0348834 (.0115154) 0.004
# of children 0-17 in the family -126.4458 (79.19902) 0.118
dummy for presence of infants -218.1202 (37.58655)       <.001
# of family members 21.94691 (79.47724) 0.784
dummy for black 223.6212 (42.92378)       <.001
dummy for legal abortion -228.9209 (103.9693) 0.033
dummy for unilateral divorce -20.98487 (49.30132) 0.672
dummy for community property law -27.90524 (114.7418) 0.809
unilateral X community property law -131.0397 (129.2954) 0.316
intercept 236.0305 (1225.962) 0.848
# observations (# HH) 3254 (968)  
  42 Table 3 
 
Labor supply regression specification with region fixed effects (dependent variable = annual hours worked) 
 
Coefficients of dy_low80 and dy_high20, dummy variables for whether abortion is legal and an observation is in a state ranked bottom 80 % or top 20% in the yearly ranking of 
state abortion rates (# of abortion per 1000 live births) 
 
 
Married   Married    Single   Divorced  Men married 
fertile non-fertile    fertile    fertile to fertile
women women    women   women
dy_low80 dy_high20 dy_low80 dy_high20 dy_low80 dy_high20 dy_low80 dy_high20 dy_low80 dy_high20
coeff. -283.026 -406.024 20.06508 -3.40724 46.87817 164.9584 -150.522 -138.05 110.5746 169.3013
robust SE 69.24833 94.27175 116.7178 170.9283 102.7196 119.0822 203.7031 289.398 37.48834 59.54954
P value    < .001 < .001 0.864 0.984 0.651 0.176 0.465 0.636 0.005 0.007
test dy_low80=dy_high20     
p value= 0.0131 0.79 0.0931 0.9196 0.1135
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Pooled regression (with region fixed effects) to test for the statistical difference of the dy_legal coefficients between married fertile women, their husbands and married non-
fertile women. 
The comparison group is men married to fertile women.  
pooling married: married women fertile + married women non fertile + men married to fertile women
↕↕             ↕
dummy variables for each group: dy_womanXfertile dy_womanXnon fertile comparison group  
All regressors are interacted with dy_womanXfertile and dy_womanXnon fertile.




robust SE 1643.803 3186.643
P value 0.733 0.534
dy_womanXfertileXdy_legal dy_womanXnon fertileXdy_legal dy_legal
coeff. -313.663 ♣ -58.4868 84.74177
robust SE 105.1695 117.818 30.02624
P value *      .005 **    0.622 0.007
♣ = coefficient of dy_legal for fertile women minus coefficient of dy_legal for men married to fertile
→ *married fertile women statistically different from their husbands 
**non-fertile married women not statistically different from husbands of fertile women
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Pooled regression (with region fixed effects) to test for the statistical difference of the dy_legal coefficients between married fertile women, their husbands and married non-
fertile women. 
The comparison group is married women non fertile.  
pooling married: married women fertile + married women non fertile + men married to fertile women
↕↕             ↕
dummy variables for each group: dy_womanXfertile comparison group   dy_manXfertile
All regressors are interacted with dy_womanXfertile and dy_manXfertile.




robust SE 2770.81 3186.643
P value 0.36 0.534
dy_womanXfertileXdy_legal dy_manXfertileXdy_legal dy_legal
coeff. -255.176 ♦ 58.48679 26.25499
robust SE 101.819 117.818 112.2361
P value *     0.016 **    0.622 0.816
♦ = coefficient of dy_legal for fertile women minus coefficient of dy_legal for non fertile women
→ *married fertile women statistically different from non fertile women
**husbands of fertile women not statistically different from non-fertile married women
Heckman 2 step specification yields the same results. 
Reg dy_states, FE and RE model specifications do not exhibit statistical difference between fertile and non-fertile married women.
 
  45 Table 5 
 
Sample split according to religion: totally against abortion (catholic) versus not against it for fetus’ health problem and/or unwantedness (Methodist, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, 
non-religious in general). 
Labor supply specifications with region fixed effects, heckman 2 step and regression with state fixed effects, run on married fertile women separately for each of these religion 
subsamples. 
Coefficients of dy_legal (1 if abortion is legal). 
 
 
totally against versus not against 
reg coeff. -38.3774 -270.363
robust SE 155.3451 71.20102
P value 0.806   < .001
Heckman coeff. -75.6486 -317.816
2 step robust SE 181.6089 75.15555
P value 0.677   < .001
reg with coeff. -34.0743 -130.322
dy states robust SE 229.9041 95.25729
P value 0.883 0.179
# observations  538 821
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Sample split according to birth control: households using birth control versus households not using any. 
Labor supply specifications with region fixed effects, heckman 2 step and regression with state fixed effects run on married fertile women, separately for each of these birth 
control subsamples. 
Coefficients of dy_legal (1 if abortion is legal). 
  
 
birth control versus no birth control
reg coeff. -132.424 -324.359
robust SE 91.72249 136.0439
P value 0.157 0.021
Heckman coeff. -125.118 -328.503
2 step robust SE 100.0996 149.7651
P value 0.211 0.028
reg with coeff. -61.326 -257.439
dy states robust SE 100.662 102.8194
P value 0.546 0.016
# observations  1508 1708
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Sample split according to expecting children: households who expect to have more children versus households who do not. 
Labor supply specifications with region fixed effects, heckman 2 step and regression with state fixed effects, run on married fertile women separately for each of these expecting 
children subsamples. 
Coefficients of dy_legal (1 if abortion is legal). 
 
 




robust SE 160.9679 85.19503
P value 0.028 0.27
Heckman coeff. -372.739 -98.9465
2 step robust SE 173.1763 90.63988
P value 0.031 0.275
reg with coeff. -354.056 -24.677
dy states robust SE 131.8403 72.20521
P value 0.01 0.734
# observations  1258 1748
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Endogeneity of children 
 
Reduced form: without children variables. 
 
Labor supply specification with region fixed effects, heckman 2 step and regression with state fixed effects, run on the various groups of households. 




     Married        Married       Single      Divorced  Men married 
    fertile    non-fertile     fertile     fertile to fertile women
    women     women     women     women
reg  coeff. -218.0587 22.75624 49.16694 -143.2091 82.95802
robust SE 125.3994 109.4018 133.4684 202.1719 30.90407
P value 0.089 0.836 0.715 0.484 0.01
Heckman coeff. -122.4078 74.86539 58.99938 -165.8361               *
2 step robust SE 92.25219 185.1588 108.8397 169.5992
P value 0.185 0.686 0.588 0.328
reg with coeff. -137.95 -124.1756 -87.17336 -188.7488 82.92927
dy states robust SE 82.80495 183.4485 84.70196 190.1463 38.36995
P value 0.103 0.502 0.311 0.328 0.036
# observations 3254 1026 672 538 3254
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Endogeneity of children and wages 
 
Reduced form: without children variables and without wage variables. 
 
Labor supply specification with region fixed effects, heckman 2 step and regression with state fixed effects, run on the various groups of households. 




   Married      Married      Single      Divorced  Men married 
   fertile    non-fertile    fertile    fertile to fertile women
   women    women    women    women
reg  coeff. -217.449 -16.97248 55.80685 -143.3301 54.10276
robust SE 133.4824 121.4101 121.7724 203.7939 30.82676
P value 0.11 0.89 0.65 0.487 0.086
Heckman coeff. -217.797 47.35859 51.22016 -164.9558               *
2 step robust SE 133.2733 207.2481 115.2914 190.4857
P value 0.102 0.819 0.657 0.387
reg with coeff. -131.44 -151.5257 -98.70588 -185.3996 58.05851
dy states robust SE 90.59801 185.6277 110.4946 192.1337 35.8832
P value 0.154 0.419 0.379 0.342 0.113
# observations 3254 1026 672 538 3254
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Endogeneity of children, non-labor income and wages 
 
Instrumental variables 
instrumented: children variables, # of family members, non-labor income, wages 
instruments: squared years of school, father’s education, dummy variable for catholic, dummy variable for latinos, lagged wages, lagged non-labor income, usual regressors. 
 
Labor supply instrumental variable specifications with region fixed effects and with state fixed effects, run on the various groups of households. 





   Married      Married      Single      Divorced  Men married 
   fertile    non-fertile    fertile    fertile to fertile women
   women    women    women    women
reg coeff. -251.2272 -70.11441 8.779538 63.72698 65.89961
SE 127.1843 174.7398 231.994 1159.551 74.79564
P value 0.055 0.69 0.97 0.957 0.383
reg with coeff. -255.1584 -238.4495 -102.312 3140.038 85.35779
dy states SE 210.8705 307.8587 149.4029 31884.83 89.53028
P value 0.233 0.443 0.499 0.922 0.346
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Sample split according to race: black versus white. 
 
Labor supply specification with region fixed effects, run on married fertile women separately for each of these race subsamples. 
 





RACE      black versus     white
reg coeff. -219.971 -231.997
robust SE 270.002 90.06161
P value 0.422 0.013
Heckman coeff. -474.748 -241.484
2 step robust SE 85.18445 93.07167
P value   < .001 0.009
reg with coeff. -258.101 -139.144
dy states robust SE 313.1801 52.51451
P value 0.417 0.011
# observations  918 2212
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Sample split according to income: top 10 % of the per capita household income distribution versus the remaining bottom 90 %. 
 
Labor supply specification with region fixed effects, run on married fertile women separately for each of these income subsamples. 
 




RICH rich versus not rich
reg coeff. -28.1744 -263.207
robust SE 158.6374 100.5283
P value 0.86 0.012
Heckman coeff. -85.1317 -244.891
2 step robust SE 103.7555 117.7303
P value 0.412 0.038
reg with coeff. 125.6645 -211.249
dy states robust SE 180.3523 80.10892
P value 0.491 0.012
# observations  234 3020
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Sample split according to income: bottom 10 % of the per capita household income distribution versus the remaining top 90 %. 
 
Labor supply specification with region fixed effects, run on married fertile women separately for each of these income subsamples. 
 




POOR poor versus not poor
reg coeff. -213.612 -221.87
robust SE 162.7115 102.6152
P value 0.199 0.036
Heckman coeff. -1178.76 -223.899
2 step robust SE 93787.22 112.6973
P value 0.99 0.047
reg with coeff. -392.003 -148.801
dy states robust SE 195.41 64.94011
P value 0.053 0.027
# observations  412 2842







  54 Divorce laws in the US 
                             unilateral consent and community property 
 
 
• 1970-1975       AZ CA CO IN IA ME MN MT NE NV NM OK OR WA 
                               unilateral w/o fault grounds and lengthy separation 
 
                               AZ CA ID LA NV NM TX WA 
                                     community property already in place 
 
 
•  dy_unil = 1                 if there is the unilateral provision    
•  dy_comprop = 1         if there is the community property provision 
•  unil_X_comprop = 1   if there are both these provisions  
 
•   unilateral per se not favorable to women 
                       while            
        unilateral combined with community property should increase female bargaining power 
 
                      
                          Gray (1998); Friedberg (1998); Chiappori et al. (2002)  
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